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Abstract
Based on field observations and an empirical survey on religion and identity that was 
conducted among the Slavic Orthodox population in the wider Baku area and in  Ganja, 
this article examines the identity and social position of this community, now the 
country’s main Christian population group. While earlier research on the  nominally 
Christian Slavic groups in the Caspian–Central Asian space tended to concentrate on 
ethnolinguistic and political issues, this research focuses on religious identification, 
religious practice, and the status of the Orthodox Church. Numbering just 1.5 percent 
of the population, the Orthodox Christian community in Azerbaijan is nearing extinc-
tion due to its aging membership. Nonetheless, Orthodox Christianity will keep a pres-
ence in the country and its society, although it could attract a more heterogeneous 
following.
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1
1 Bernard Voutat and René Knuesel, “La question des minorités. Une perspective de sociologie 
politique,” Politix 10, no. 38 (1997): 139–140.
…
Reactionaries and Marxists will both live as uncomfortably in future 
 society. But whereas the Marxists will look upon it with the eyes of a 
dumbfounded parent, we will regard it with the irony of an outsider.
–nicolas gomez davila (1913–1994)
⸪
Predominantly Slavic Orthodox, the Christian community comprises a small 
minority in contemporary Azerbaijan. Both their actual presence and their 
historical importance as a dominant minority in the country, however, are vis-
ible in the form of active Orthodox churches and parishes typically situated 
close to railway stations, former sites of military barracks, in specific rural 
areas, and in Baku’s nineteenth-century European quarter. All of these loca-
tions reflect well the historical circumstances in which an Orthodox presence 
was established in this part of the southern Caspian. During the 1990s, research-
ers and policymakers alike expressed interest in the position and predicament 
of nominally Christian Slavic groups in the non-Slavic Soviet successor states. 
The focus, however, was clearly on ethnolinguistic and political issues more 
than religious doctrine. Furthermore, interest in the religious dynamics of the 
Caspian–Central Asian region has long tended to focus on Islam rather than 
on Christianity, with an exception perhaps for the new Protestant churches 
and movements.
This article examines the present social and identity characteristics of Azer-
baijan’s Orthodox Christians, and the role and place of religion in safeguard-
ing their minority identity and social cohesion since 1991, when Azerbaijan, 
a country whose majority population traditionally identifies with Shia and 
Sunni Islam, became independent. According to Charles Wagley and Marvin 
Harris, several characteristics are prevalent among minorities. For example, 
they usually have a subordinate position within societies. The members of the 
group share visible traits or characteristics that differentiate them from other 
groups. The minority group is a self-conscious social unit. Membership in this 
unit is usually determined by genealogy. And, finally, members tend to marry 
within the self-group.1
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2 Rufat Garagözlu and Hikmet Hajizade conducted and coordinated the quantitative part of 
the survey “Social Organization and Identity among the Slavic Orthodox population in Azer-
baijan” in Baku city, the wider Baku area and in Ganja. The research was funded by the fwo 
Research Foundation Flanders and the Marie Curie Skłodowska-Curie caspian-itn project. 
Bruno De Cordier also published a brief article based on this research in the February 2016 
issue of Caucasus Analytical Digest.
What triggered our curiosity was a series of events well beyond the southern 
Caspian. These included the popular uprisings and coup d’états that occurred 
in the Arab region beginning in late 2010, and the renewed attention that these 
occasions drew for the presence of Copts and other Christian minorities in 
the majority Islamic societies there. Although the southern Caucasus and the 
Arab world are indeed two very different environments, a number of insights, 
observations, and typologies regarding Christians in Arab–Muslim societies 
supplement those available for the Slavic minorities in non-Slavic ussr suc-
cessor states. The analysis presented here is based on these works, field obser-
vations, and a 37-question survey on religion and identity that was conducted 
in October and November 2015, in cooperation with an Azerbaijani research 
association, among 300 members of the relevant population in the wider Baku 
area and in Ganja.2
 Social Geography in Historical Perspective
Within the official contours of Azerbaijan, Slavic Orthodox Christians form 
the largest Christian minority in the country alongside adherents of the 
 Armenian Apostolic Church. Since the latter are mainly concentrated in 
Nagorno- Karabakh, a disputed region occupied by Armenia, they are cut off 
from Azerbaijan’s wider society and governance structures. This means that 
in “rump Azerbaijan”, the Orthodox now form the largest Christian minority. 
Often  colloquially referred to as “the Russians” rather than “the Orthodox,” the 
Slavic Orthodox, who now form around 1.5 percent of the population, basically 
consist of three ethnic-social categories with rather fluid boundaries. First, 
of course, there are citizens of Slavic ancestry proper. These comprise some 
140,000 ethnic Russians – including roughly 1,500 Cossacks – Ukrainians, and 
Belarusians. Among all of these, a form of Orthodox Christianity is historically 
and at least nominally part of their ethno-cultural identity.
Second come around 3,000 Molokans, who belong to a schismatic current of 
Spiritual Christians (dukhovnye khristiane) to which the Dukhobors also be-
long. Although the members of this minority within the minority are officially 
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3
3 This near-convergence of a religious adherents grouping and a non-indigenous ethnic-racial 
population is quite similar to the predominantly French Pieds-Noirs following of Roman 
 Catholicism that existed in Algeria until 1959–1962. Around 1959, people of Roman Catholic 
background or tradition formed 7–9 percent of a population of some 11.2 million. The group 
has almost disappeared, however, with the departure, after independence in 1962, of the 
country’s Franco-European population, a large part of which, like part of the Slavs in Azer-
baijan, had lived in the country for generations. Today, Roman Catholicism has a symbolic 
presence in Algeria, with four dioceses and some monasteries most often staffed by clergy 
born outside of the country. They see themselves as custodians of a Christian presence in the 
area that dates back to late Antiquity.
considered to be Russians, their distinctive identity and a lifestyle centered 
around a  sixteenth-century breakaway sect of Orthodox Christianity – remi-
niscent somehow of an Orthodox version of the Amish – and a presence in the 
country that predates that of most of Azerbaijan’s present-day Slavic groups, 
make, that they are locally often seen as a group separate from the adherents 
of mainstream Orthodox Christianity.  Third, there are the people of mixed 
Slavic-Azerbaijani origin who identify themselves to one or another degree 
with Orthodox Christianity and who are also often accounted or declare them-
selves to be Russian in censuses. What these three population groups have in 
common, is the use of Russian as their primary language.
The portion of the population actively using Russian in everyday life, or 
as the language of inter-ethnic communication, is actually much larger that 
the Slavic minority, though. With officially 21.4 and 23.7 percent, respectively, 
fluency and use of Russian is quite high among certain ethnic minorities like 
the Georgians and the Lezgins. Like the Slavic peoples, the Georgians are part 
of the country’s traditional Christian minority, while the Lezgins, a predomi-
nantly Sunni Muslim group, are concentrated in a geographic area adjacent 
to the Russian border and also consider the Russian language as a mean to 
counterweight real or feared assimilation in the Azerbaijani majority culture. 
Russian speakers (russkoyazychnye) also include many intergenerational- urban 
Azerbaijani who are engaged in intellectual professions and who received 
most of their education in Russian. So, although Orthodoxy also has adherents 
among non-Slavic and métis (people of mixed-race, usually Slavic and Turkic) 
groups, the Slavic population and Russian speakers form, by far, its main ethno- 
demographic or physical and ethnic base.3
Few members of the majority Azerbaijani population would describe 
themselves as Orthodox Christians. As such, the Orthodox minority in the 
country differs from Arab Coptic Christians, for instance, in the sense that the 
latter ethnolinguistically do belong to the indigenous Arab majority and at 
once differ from it by confession. Today, the largest portion of the country’s 
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Orthodox Slavs, roughly 90 percent, live in Baku or within a radius of 30 
 kilometers around the city. Beyond that, there are much smaller communi-
ties in the  cities of Ganja, Mingäçevir, and Lenkoran on the southern Caspi-
an coast. In rural Azerbaijan, there are small communities in Ismaili district, 
specifically in Ivanovka where the majority of the Molokans live, in Xaçmaz, 
where there is a residual concentration of people of Belarusian and Cossack 
origin, and also in some rural districts along the Azerbaijani–Georgian border. 
Slavs and  Orthodox do not form a majority in any district.4 Table 1 offers a his-
torical overview of the shifting demographic share of Slavs (Russians, Ukraini-
ans, and  Belarusians) in Azerbaijan between 1897 and the most recent national 
population census in 2009. As one can see, this minority’s present population 
share is a fraction of previous levels.
Table 1 The evolution of the absolute number and relative population share of Slavs in 
 Azerbaijan between 1897 and 2009
1897* 1926** 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 1999 2009
Total number 
(persons)
95,736 241,653 553,433 531,344 544,148 506,439 432,482 170,700 143,800
Slavic-Orthodox 
population share 
percent
5.6 10.6 17.3 14.3 10.6 8.4 6.2 2.1 1.6
* Figures for the Governorates of Baku and Elisabetpol, whose joint territory more or less en-
compassed that of present-day Azerbaijan. The figures comprise what was then called Greater 
Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians.
** Situation for the Azerbaijani ssr of the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Federative Republic.
Sources: Data for 1897: “Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis’ naseleniya Rossiyskoy Imperii 1897 g. 
Raspredelenie naseleniya po rodnomy yazyku i uezdam Rossiyskoy Imperii krome guberniy 
Evropeyskoy Rossii,” Demoskop, http://www.demoscope.ru; Data for 1926–1989: “Vsesoyuznaya 
perepis’ naseleniya 1926 goda. Natsional’nyy sostav naseleniya po respublikam sssr” and 
“Vsesoyuznaya perepis’ naseleniya 1939 (1959, 1970, 1979, 1989) goda. Natsional’nyy sostav nas-
eleniya po respublikam sssr,” Demoskop, http://www.demoscope.ru; Data for 1999 and 2009: 
State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, data spreadsheets of the population censuses of 
1999 and 2009, http://www.stat.gov.az.
4
4 There are no neighborhoods or townships in Baku and Ganja with a specific concentration 
of Orthodox Slavs either, like the Greek Orthodox neighborhoods and suburbs in Beirut and 
especially Tripoli in Lebanon, for example.
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6
7
8
5 André Bourgey, “Les minorités et l’organisation de l’espace de l’Orient arabe,” Cahiers de la 
Méditerrannée 41, no. 1 (1990): 186–196.
6 Founded in 488, the Apostolic Church of Caucasian Albania, which has some 3,800 adherents, 
primarily among the Ibero-Caucasian Udi minority in Gabala, is the oldest surviving and of-
ficially recognized church in present-day Azerbaijan. See Sara Kasumova, “O khristianstve 
v srednevekovom Azerbaydzhane,” Kavkaz i globalizatsiya—zhurnal sotsial’no-politicheskikh 
i ekonomicheskikh issledovaniy 4, no. 3–4 (2010): 176–183. Caucasian Albania is a historical 
region that existed during Antiquity and the early Middle Ages on the territory of what is 
now northwestern Azerbaijan and southern Dagestan, and has no relation with Albania in 
the Balkans.
7 A similar category, minorities whose presence results from and invokes a country’s past 
belonging to a larger political space, is also identified in Marek Koter, “Classification 
géographique des minorités ethniques,” Espaces, populations, sociétés 3 (1994): 293.
8 Sudaba Zeynalova, “Etnodemograficheskie izmeneniya na Kavkaze: formirovanie 
 evropeyskikh obshchin (xix―nachalo xx vv.),” Kavkaz i globalizatsiya—zhurnal sotsial’no-
politicheskikh i ekonomicheskikh issledovaniy 3, no. 4 (2009): 108–121; Zahida Alizade, 
French geographer André Bourgey distinguishes three types of Christian mi-
norities in majority Islamic countries.5 First, there are what he calls the tra-
ditional or historical minorities whose presence mostly predates the coming 
of Islam. They are usually remnants of a once much larger – if not majority – 
Christian presence in the given area. Examples include the Copts in Egypt and 
Azerbaijan’s tiny Udi-Albanian community.6 Second come Christians whose 
presence is the result of recent labor migration. A typical example are the size-
able numbers of Roman Catholic Filipinos in the high-income countries of the 
Persian–Arab Gulf. And third, and most relevant here, are Christian minorities 
whose presence is the outcome of major political shifts that took place dur-
ing the last two centuries, like population movements and displacement, the 
annexation and integration of the given areas and societies in a greater space, 
and the emergence of nation-states and the border delineation that goes with 
it.7 A clear example in this category is the Armenian community of Aleppo, 
much of which arrived after 1915 as expellees and deportees from the core ar-
eas of the then moribund Ottoman empire.
This category is also where Azerbaijan’s Orthodox minority fits, for its pres-
ence is the outcome of major political shifts. A permanent Orthodox Slav 
 presence in contemporary Azerbaijan goes back as far as the 1795–1826 period, 
when groups of Cossacks settled along the southern Caspian coast. In 1830, 
religious dissidents like the Molokans and Doukhobors, facing increasing pres-
sure and persecution in Russia proper, migrated to the Mugan steppe or were 
resettled there. Starting around 1860, an increasing number of Slavic peasant 
communities came into being in what were then the Baku and Elisabetpol 
Governorates.8 The industrialization drive that came with Baku’s first oil boom 
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10
 “Natsional’no-kolonial’naya politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva na tsentral’nom Kavkaze,” 
 Kavkaz i globalizatsiya—zhurnal sotsial’no-politicheskikh i ekonomicheskikh issledovaniy 
1, no. 5 (2007): 161–170.
9 Garik Galstyan, “Les minorités russes dans le Sud-Caucase: une diaspora en voie 
d’extinction,” Le Courrier des Pays de l’Est 1043 (2004): 30–32.
10 “Azerbaijan’s Demographic Change: Implications for Social Policy and Poverty,” 
 Washington, dc, World Bank, Human Development Sector Unit, South Caucasus Country 
Department, No. 63155-az (2011): 17.
(ca. 1870–1910) and with the economic modernization and social transforma-
tion that took place in the Azerbaijani ssr (ca. 1930–1960) created further 
channels of Slavic settlement in the country up to a zenith of more than 17 
percent of the population by the year 1939. This gradually decreased due to 
higher birth rates among the Azerbaijani majority and due to moratoriums on 
resettlement after 1959.
However, the most dramatic population plunge occurred in the 1988–1993 
period. Between early 1988 and autumn 1993, the Azerbaijani ssr and, after 
late 1991, newly independent Azerbaijan were affected by communal unrest 
between Azerbaijani and ethnic Armenians in and around Baku and the 1990 
Black January crackdown, the Nagorno-Karabakh War, a secession attempt in 
the southern region of Talysh-Mugan, and finally a factional coup in Ganja. 
The Orthodox Slavs, as a dominant minority in the republic, were not specifi-
cally targeted during the turmoil. Nonetheless, the disintegration of a ussr 
with which they strongly identified (and, in part, still do so up to this day), the 
perspective of long-term chaos, and the rapid decline of the industries and 
social institutions in which they were economically active, were perceived to 
be an existential threat.9 The subsequent mass exodus now seems to be more 
or less stabilized. In our survey, 58 percent of the respondents declared that 
they did not to want to leave Azerbaijan at all, while 3.7 percent decided to do 
so permanently, and 11.7 percent were uncertain.
The culturally Orthodox community that remains today has a number of 
identifiable social characteristics. First, although there are officially no  separate 
population pyramids for minorities in Azerbaijan, observations and interac-
tion with the community under examination as well as local academic sources 
suggest that, due to both the emigration of a sizeable part of its younger strata 
after 1988–1993 and smaller families than those among Azerbaijan’s Muslim 
or at least culturally Muslim majority, perhaps up to two-thirds of this com-
munity is over 40 years of age. Slightly over 28 percent in our research group 
declared themselves to be pensioners, which is more than double the national 
average.10 In turn, this top-heavy age structure partly explains the second char-
acteristic, namely the disproportional number of women as compared to the 
national population.
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13
11 Sivilia Serrano, “Les Russes du Caucase du Sud: du malheur d’avoir une empire (et de 
le perdre),” Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest 39, no. 1 (2008): 201–202. See also 
 Christophe Z. Guilmoto, “La masculinisation des naissances. État des lieux et des con-
naissances,” Population 70, no. 2 (2015): 217.
12 Observations at different Orthodox parishes and churches in Baku and Xaçmaz, October 
20–26, 2015.
13 “Azerbaijan living Conditions Assessment Report,” Washington, dc, World Bank, Human 
Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region, Report No. 52801-az (2010): 50.
Here again, observation and interaction, as well as some literature sources, 
suggest that up to two-thirds of the Orthodox Slav population in Azerbaijan is 
female, which is in sharp contrast to the national average, which shows a slight 
surplus of men.11 Other explanatory factors include, first, the higher longevity 
among women and, second, the number of women of Slav origin who came to 
Azerbaijan or stayed there after 1988–1993 because of a marriage, often con-
cluded during the latter ussr era, with an Azerbaijani husband. Among our 
respondents, 23.3 percent declared themselves to belong to this category. As a 
matter of fact, both of these social characteristics of the Orthodox community 
were quite visible when we observed how the audience of liturgies and the 
active parishioners in Baku and Xaçmaz were overwhelmingly female and 
over 50.12 In terms of household size, 28 percent declared their household to 
consist of two people or less, 57 percent of three to four persons, and 15 per-
cent of five or more. This is far smaller than the national average and below 
the household sizes of the Muslim Azerbaijani majority, where the share of 
households of two people or less consists of 7.6 percent, of three to four per-
sons of 10.3 percent, and those of five or more of 44.9 percent.13
Third, in terms of highest education level achieved, 41.7 percent declared 
to have completed secondary education, and in Ganja this was the highest 
education level completed among 62 percent of the respondents. As for higher 
education, 56 percent declared to have a professional college or university de-
gree, with a particularly high portion in Baku city, where nearly two-thirds of 
the respondents had completed this level. At 36 percent, Ganja has the lowest 
share of Orthodox people with higher education among the urban localities 
surveyed. This is primarily because smaller cities have been more affected by 
emigration, both to abroad and to Baku, of their more educated population 
segments since 1988–1991. And fourth, when asked to assess their overall stan-
dard of living, 6 percent of the respondents declared that they live in extreme 
poverty, 11 percent are (rather) wealthy, while over three-quarters character-
ized their situation as “acceptable” or sufficient but nonetheless precarious. 
Unlike certain countries and societies where religious minorities are concen-
trated among the business elites, the Orthodox in Azerbaijan are nearly absent 
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from the country’s financial oligarchy because they do not have access to the 
necessary patronage networks.
As Figure 1 shows, in terms of social position and occupation, besides a dis-
proportionally large portion of pensioners, 23.7 percent of the respondents 
declared themselves to be active in the private sector or self-employed, and 
16.3 percent answered that they work in technical or so-called liberal profes-
sions. Russian companies and educational institutions and faculties where 
Russian is the language of instruction often form specific employment niches. 
Molokans, for their part, are predominantly active in agriculture. Some of their 
products have recently achieved some sort of fashionable branding status as 
 “ecologically pure food” in Baku’s supermarkets. Although some Orthodox 
Slavs do work for government institutions, their presence in that sphere is lim-
ited. This is due, first, to the requirement of fluency in Azerbaijani and, second 
and more important, because they have less support from patronage networks 
that are necessary to obtain positions in the state bureaucracy.15
 Orthodox Nation or “Ethno-Christians”?
What place does religion have in the overall self-identification of the Orthodox 
in Azerbaijan? And is religious affiliation a primary and determining identity 
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Figure 1 Declared occupations and socioeconomic status (in number of respondents)14
14
15
14 All graphics were created by Bruno De Cordier in summer and autumn 2016 on the bases 
of the results of the survey.
15 Galstyan, “Les minorités russes dans le Sud-Caucase.” For more on the formation and so-
cial geography of Azerbaijan’s patronage networks, see Viatcheslav Avioutskii, “Les clans 
en Azerbaïdjan,” Le Courrier des pays de l’Est 1063 (2007): 67–79.
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16 For insights into the functions and position of Orthodoxy and its institutions in the for-
mation and continuation of present-day Russian ethnonational identity, see Vitaliy A. 
Plotkin, “Rol’ pravoslaviya v formirovanii rossiyskoy natsional’noy idei,” Izvestia Penzensk-
ogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo Universiteta 27 (2012): 895–898.
factor as is the case with Christian minority groups, like the Copts in the Arab 
sphere, for example? As Figure 2 shows, a clear majority of the respondents 
consider themselves primarily to be either Russian (more than 53 percent), 
an Azerbaijani citizen of Russian origin (23 percent), or of mixed Slavic– 
Azerbaijani background (a bit over 16 percent). A further six percent identified 
primarily as members of other Slavic ethnicities, while an insignificant share 
of the respondents identified themselves in terms of traditional faith, that is, 
as an Orthodox Christian. This suggests already that Orthodox Christianity is 
considered to be a component of and subordinate to a broader ethnic identity 
rather than a nation in its own right.
The relevance of religious adherence as a component of a wider ethnic and 
social identity became even clearer when the same respondents were asked to 
which confession, religious denomination, or church they adhered or identi-
fied themselves with, no matter whether they were practicing or not. As re-
ported in Figure 3, only slightly more than one percent replied as belonging 
to or identifying with none. A similar portion cited Islam and Judaism; these 
respondents are probably either members of mixed Slavic-Jewish families or 
individual Slavic or métis converts to Shia or Sunni Islam. The vast majority, 
nearly 83 percent, declared that they belong to the Russian Orthodox Church 
of the Moscow Patriarchate, which apparently many consider to be an inalien-
able part of Russian ethnonational identity.16 Interestingly, about one-sixth of 
the population of interest, that is, not a marginal share, said that it followed 
other churches or confessions.
This basically includes two categories. First, there are those who belong to 
other Oriental churches, like Ukrainian Greek Catholics, Georgian Orthodox, 
Other (‛Cosmopolitan’)t
Orthodox Christian
Russian speaker
Belarussian
1 (0.33 percent)
1 (0.33 percent)
2 (0.66 percent)
4 (1.32 percent)
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49 (16.33 percent)
69 (23 percent)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
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Ukrainian
Of mixed Azerbaijni-Slavic origin (‛métis’)
Azerbaijani citizen of Russian origin
Russian
Figure 2 Primary self-identification (“Who or what do you consider yourself to be in the 
first place?”) among the Slavic and culturally Orthodox population (in numbers of 
respondents and percent share)
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and followers of the Udi-Albanian Church, who turn to Orthodox parishes be-
cause their own denomination has no institutions, parishes, or clergy where 
they live. Second, and even more important, there are the adherents of the 
various Protestant and charismatic denominations who came to Azerbaijan 
during the 1990s.17 Due to a number of circumstances and sociological reasons, 
they attracted some following among the Slav minority and among métis in 
urban areas. Although their activity and growth seems to have stabilized if not 
stagnated over the past seven or eight years, the Orthodox eparchy of Baku ac-
tively monitors Protestant and Pentecostal groups. Individual priests also told 
us that countering the influence of non-traditional sects among the histori-
cally Orthodox population remains one of the tasks and raisons d’être of their 
ecclesiastical work.18
Other (Other ethnic
Oriental churches, and
Protestantism and
Pentecostalism)
14.76 percent
The Russian Orthodox
Church of the Moscow
Patriarchate
82.6 percent
None
1.07 percent
Islam and
Judaism
1.07 percent Molokans or
Spiritual
Christians
0.5 percent
Figure 3 Confessional self-affiliation among the Slavic and culturally Orthodox population in 
Azerbaijan (in percent share of respondents)
17
18
17 A few of these adhere to traditional Protestant denominations like Lutherans and Calvin-
ism. Most however, align with Pentecostal groups, Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Orthodox Church as well colloquial parlance commonly re-
fers to these groups as sektanstvo (“sects” or “sectism”). Sergo Namoradze, “Protestantizm 
na Kavkaze,” Kavkaz i globalizatsiya—zhurnal sotsial’no-politicheskikh i ekonomicheskikh 
issledovaniy 2, no. 3 (2008): 178–180.
18 Interviews and conversations in Baku and Xaçmaz, October 22–25, 2015. This actually 
fits into a historical pattern in which the Orthodox hierarchy in Moscow and the then 
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 Eparchy of the Transcaucasus considered the establishment of parishes among the Slav-
ic settlers vital to counter the influence of schismatic Orthodox sects and Baptism. See 
Fuad Agayev, “Stroitel’stvo pravoslavnykh tserkvey v ramkakh pereselencheskoy politiki 
tsarisma v severnom Azerbaydzhane v kontse xix—nachale xx vv.,” Baky Universitetinin 
Xäbärläri 2 (2012): 153.
19 Hikmet Hajizade, “Nationwide Opinion Poll on the Socio-political Situation and the 
 Problems of Religious Freedom and Religious Extremism in Azerbaijan,” Baku, Center for 
Economic and Political Research (2012): 6.
Figure 4 goes deeper into the declared levels of religious practice and active 
faith. If we convert this data into percentages, then we see that 18 percent of 
the Orthodox or ethnically Orthodox respondents declared to be practicing 
believers, with the highest scores in the age brackets of 41–65 and older than 
65; 61 percent non-practicing believers with highest among the 18–28 years old; 
14.6 percent indifferent toward religion; and 3.6 percent committed atheists 
with the highest level among respondents older than 65. The latter is partly be-
cause of a stronger identification with the ussr and its official atheism among 
certain age and social groups. How does this compare to the national average 
and especially to the Muslim Azerbaijani majority population? Available em-
pirical evidence from country-wide research conducted in autumn 2012 with a 
near-identical question and with similar reply categories found that 16.9 per-
cent of the ethnic and religious majority segment considered themselves to be 
practicing believers, 19.7 percent believers and irregular practitioners, 61 per-
cent non-practicing believers, and one percent committed atheists.19
No answer 7
11
44
55
183
No, because convinced atheist
No, for indifferent towards religion
Believer but not practicing
Yes, and practicing
Figure 4 Shares of declared believers and non-believers (“Do you consider yourself to be a 
religious believer?”) (in number of respondents)
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20
20 “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity,” Washington, dc, Pew Research Center—Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life (2012): 131.
In the meantime, the share of the practicing believers among Sunni and 
Shia Azerbaijani has grown to over 20 percent of the population, especially in 
Baku, in some Shia areas in the far south, and in certain Sunni parts of northern 
Azerbaijan. Figure 5 reflects the importance bestowed on religion in  everyday 
life. If we convert these results into percentages, then the share of Orthodox 
Christians in Azerbaijan who consider religion to be a very important part of 
everyday life is 7.7 percent; those replying “rather important,” 16 percent; oc-
casionally important, 49 percent; and no role at all, 21.3 percent. To put this 
into comparative perspective again with the majority population, according 
to a 2012 survey on Islamic religious practice that used comparable categories, 
36 percent among the Muslim majority in Azerbaijan considered religion to be 
very important in everyday life, 38 percent somewhat important, 22 percent 
not too important, while 2 percent replied it had no role or importance at all.20
Finally, in terms of concrete acts of religious practice reported by the re-
spondents, Figure  6 looks into the regularity of church attendance; the 
 performance of prayers and religious rituals beyond the official liturgy and 
masses; fasting; and financial and in-kind donations to Orthodox institutions 
and parishes. As one can see, regularity in all these is limited to a small mi-
nority of an equivalent of 2.5 percent on average. Rather, practice in these 
specific fields is characterized by high volatility and irregularity, is often con-
nected to the occasions of Orthodox holidays, varies per parish, depends on 
No answer
Plays no role at all
Occasionally important
Rather important
Very important 23
48
147
64
18
Figure 5 Declared importance of religion in everyday life (in number of respondents)
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21 An eparchy is the Orthodox equivalent of a diocese in Roman Catholicism. Officially, the 
Eparchy of Baku and the Cis-Caspian (which was founded in 1998), was reorganized and 
split-up for practical and organizational reasons. The Azerbaijani authorities’ dislike of 
supranational confessional entities likely was also a factor.
the availability of personal resources, and also is subject to whether and how 
one knows and interacts with individual priests and other representatives of 
the Church, their mobilizing charisma, and how these are being perceived and 
respected as persons.
 Orthodox Institutions and the Azerbaijani State
Since 2011, after the Eparchy of Baku and the Cis-Caspian, which encompassed 
Azerbaijan and Dagestan, was reorganized, the Orthodox Church in the coun-
try falls under the eparchy of Baku, which is responsible for Azerbaijan only.21 
Headed since 1999 by Archbishop Alexander (né Alexander Gennadievich 
 Ishcheni), a native of Yaroslavl who served in North Ossetia before, the  Orthodox 
church has six registered cathedrals and one chapel in the country. Four of these 
parishes are in Baku, one in Sumgait and one each in Ganja and  Xaçmaz. A 
new parish was said to be planned for the southern Caspian town of Lenkoran 
somewhere in 2017. Inversely proportional to much of the followers’ base – 
and compared to their Roman Catholic counterparts in Western Europe – the 
Church attendance
Praying and other confessional rites beyond the liturgical masses
Religious fasting
Donations to the church and/or to the parish
Regular
11 10 6 3
39 31
68
109
140
112
82
101
136
208
106
9 11 18 00
Irregular On the occasion of major
Orthodox holidays
Rarely or never Don’t know or no answer
Figure 6 Declared levels of active religiosity (in number or respondents, more than one  
answer possible)
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Orthodox clergy, which country-wide had some 30 ordained priests at the time 
of research, is predominantly young, generally in their early 30s to mid-40s. Most 
of the priests are Azerbaijani citizens and have been trained at theological col-
leges in Saratov and Stavropol, as there is no seminary in  Azerbaijan itself.
Officially, the eparchy of Baku and its parishes and clergy are not funded 
by either the Patriarchate in Moscow or the Russian government. They report-
edly depend on various kinds of private donations, elite philanthropy, in-kind 
support like the free or low-cost real estate, investment earnings, a favorable 
fiscal regime, and free utilities.22 The Orthodox Church’s claimed mission is 
not to evangelize, but to support the existing historical community and to pre-
serve an ancient Christian heritage in Azerbaijan, the roots of which go back 
to the Caucasian Albanian Church. But how strong is the level of confidence 
in it among the nominal and active Orthodox adherents’ base? According to 
survey results shown in Figure 7, 9 percent of the Orthodox Slavic community 
seems to have a high level of confidence in the Church and its clergy. Although 
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38
20
0
High level of conf idence
Orthodox Church International NGOs National and local
NGOs
Political parties Judicial courts Law enforcement
organs
Rather low level of conf idence
Rather high level of conf idence
No conf idence at all No answer or don’t know
0 0
Neutral
Figure 7 Declared confidence in the Orthodox Church and its clergy as compared to a number 
of other institutions (in number of respondents)
22
22 Interviews with Archbishop Alexander and Archpriest Mefodii Efendiev, Baku, October 
23, 2015, and conversations with parish workers in Baku and Xaçmaz, October 24–25, 2015. 
To give an example of elite patronage of the Church, the restoration of the Holy Myrrh-
Bearers Cathedral and its shrine of Saint Bartholomew the Apostle (the Orthodox patron 
saint of Baku) in the early 2000s was financed by a (now-deceased) ethnic Azerbaijani, 
Moscow-based businessman of Shia Muslim background who was married to a Russian 
and was himself related to Azerbaijan’s presidential family.
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in the minority, this is far superior to the shares, amounting to an average of 
about one percent, who ascribe a high level of trust to political parties, local as 
well as international non-governmental organizations, and the judicial system, 
for example. Regarding the clergy, 23 percent have a rather high level of trust, 
36 percent have a neutral stance, and a joint 24 percent a rather low level or no 
trust in the clergy and the Church at all.
If varying degrees of confidence in the Church, its clergy, and lay parish 
workers exist and even exceed that for a number of other, secular institutions, 
on what are they based or where are they rooted? First, there is the real and 
perceived role of the Church in the preservation of the coherence and identity 
of the minority community. As Figure 8 shows, 15 percent of the respondents 
felt that the above play a large role in this process, whereas 38 percent con-
sidered this role to be rather large to medium, and 13 percent small to non-
existent. One-third, by contrast, did not know or did not answer, which reflects 
the rather high portion in whose lives religion plays a limited to very small 
role as was previously discussed around Figure 5. In either case, the fact that 
Orthodox Christianity is perceived to be a secondary core component of an 
ethnic identity and a cultural and ideological binding agent with Russia does 
play here, in the sense, that the Church ensures some institutionalization and 
visibility of its own minority group’s presence in the country.
“The Church” must be understood here as the Baku eparchy. Only 5.3 per-
cent from the interviewed members of the Orthodox minority community 
stated that their community received any support from the Patriarchate in 
No answer or
don’t know
34 percent
Small role to
non-existent
13 percent
Rather large to 
medium
38 percent
Large
15 percent
Figure 8 Perceived role of the Orthodox Church, its clergy, and lay parish workers in the life 
and preservation of coherence and identity of the community (percentage)
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Moscow itself. There is also charitable and social work conducted by, or under 
the auspices of, the Baku eparchy and its individual representatives. Through 
its  social wing, the eparchy indeed declares that it conducts a number of chari-
table activities. Its clergy and volunteers thus organize administrative help, 
food packages, and the facilitation of medical support for the ill who cannot 
afford medical treatment, isolated pensioners, and marginalized households. 
Other social activities include Sunday schools, the organization of “Open 
Tables” on major Orthodox holidays like Easter, Trinity Sunday, Orthodox 
Christmas, the Epiphany, and the Old New Year, and the organization of cours-
es in the Azerbaijani language to promote bilingualism.23
Very often a source of legitimacy and support for religious institutions and 
movements in number of countries and societies, the Orthodox clergy and lay 
workers are perceived by the respondents’ base (see Figure 9), to be definitely 
active in the social and charitable fields by 13 percent of the respondents, and 
“up to a certain level” by a further 42 percent. Asked to specify in what par-
ticular activities they are so, the vast majority reported two fields, namely the 
organization of Orthodox religious holidays (40 percent), which do play a role 
in the minority’s cultural life, and moral and practical assistance to pension-
ers and the ill (31.6 percent), which is not surprising since pensioners form a 
large portion of the Orthodox population in the country. Furthermore, slightly 
less than 10 percent mentioned assistance to the poor (food packages, soup 
kitchens, financial help, and so on). Fewer than 7 percent consider the Ortho-
dox church to be active in education, a similar share to being an intermediary 
among themselves, the state and other ethnic-confessional communities, and 
two percent in relief aid, for example, after an earthquake or flood.
The Orthodox Church, in line with the official, secular Slavic community or-
ganizations and cultural centers, clearly keeps a legitimist stance vis-à-vis the 
state, the incumbent oligarchies and in the political realm in general, whereas 
among the grassroots, there is a relative acquiescence and political disengage-
ment if not cynicism toward the latter. Both attitude patterns are not necessar-
ily a reflection of ideological or personal sympathy or acquiescence with the 
current power elites. In their examination of the degree and reasons of support 
among religious and ethnic minorities for authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
governments in the Middle East, Ceren Belge and Emre Karakoç identify three 
cleavages that determine such support.24
23
24
23 Interviews with Archbishop Alexander and Archpriest Mefodii Efendiev, Baku, October 
23, 2015; interviews and conversations with parish worker and mass attendants at three 
parishes in Baku, October 21–22, 2015.
24 Ceren Belge and Emre Karakoç, “Minorities in the Middle East: Ethnicity, Religion, and 
Support for Authoritarianism,” Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 2 (2015): 282–283.
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The first is social class, where minorities in states in which they are dispro-
portionately represented among the wealthy will likely support the status quo. 
As has been seen earlier on, this is not the case here. The near-totality of the 
country’s financial oligarchy and wealthier segments of society are Azerbai-
jani. The second cleavage is secular-religious. In cases where state-building 
has accentuated the secular-religious cleavage by eliminating, subordinating, 
or co-opting religious institutions in a highly religious society, democratiza-
tion has different applications for differently situated minorities. Azerbaijan is 
rather a highly secularized society with increasing levels of religious observa-
tion among both the Shia and Sunni majority population. Contrary to what 
can be observed in Azerbaijani Shiism and Sunnism, Orthodoxy in the country 
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Figure 9 Perceived level of presence and activeness of the Orthodox Church, its clergy and lay 
parish workers in the social field (supra—in percent share), and the specific areas 
and activity where they are seen to be (infra—in number of respondents, more than 
one answer possible)
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26
27
25 Irène Semenoff-Tian-Chansky, “L’Église orthodoxe russe, un facteur politique à prendre 
au sérieux?,” Politique étrangère 66, no. 1 (2001): 152–153.
26 According to the survey results, 53 percent of the respondents reported that they speak, 
write, and read Azerbaijani, the official majority language, “fluently” or “rather well” and 
41.7 percent “in a limited way.”
27 For a more in-depth examination of the formation of indigenous communist state elites, 
see the Azerbaijan-related examples in Olivier Roy, La nouvelle Asie centrale ou la fabrica-
tion des nations (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 141–162; Avioutskii, “Les clans en Azerbaïdjan.”
has no real movement of independent priests and parishes who want to op-
erate and practice independently from state-sanctioned religious authorities, 
which many perceive as being too connected with the current political regime. 
Some of the people of Orthodox background who are dissatisfied with the of-
ficial clergy but who wish to remain practicing Christians may have joined the 
Protestant movements instead. In line with a policy established by the Mos-
cow Patriarchate, the Baku eparchy tries to get the most out of cohabitation 
with Muslims, in order to confront Protestantism, Pentecostalism, and other 
sects and to fight against social ills associated with globalization.25
Finally, the third cleavage is ethnic. In societies ruled by an ethnic or ethnic-
confessional minority, the status quo is advantageous; in states controlled by 
members of the ethnic majority, it is less clear-cut and depends on the status 
granted. The state is clearly dominated, if not owned, by the Azerbaijani ma-
jority, and the Orthodox Slavs no longer have the favored position of dominant 
minority they used to have in the Azerbaijani ssr. Neither do they have an au-
tonomous district or other territory in the country. By a de facto arrangement, 
they – along with the Jewish minority – do have a representative in parliament 
who is a member of the presidential party. The Russian language, a crucial 
identity component, has been largely removed from both the official sphere 
and the public space – although scores of Russian loanwords continue to be 
used in both colloquial and official Azerbaijani – but it remains important as a 
lingua franca and idiom of education, especially in Baku and to a lesser extent 
Ganja.26
Azerbaijan’s current power elites, shaped and partly Russianized as they 
were in the mold of the ussr and its policies of indigenization of the com-
munist structures, are, however, seen to form some continuity with a ussr that 
nearly 63 percent of respondents in our survey have “very” or “rather” positive 
associations with.27 More importantly, there is a rather strong feeling among 
the population of interest, reinvigorated more recently by the psychological 
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28 For an example of how this is actively promoted at the un Alliance of Civilizations, see 
http://www.unaoc.org/2013/09/from-land-of-fire-to-land-of-tolerance.
impact of the war in Donbass in southeastern Ukraine and by the horrors of 
the Syrian war, that for all its corruption and autocratic ills and excesses, the 
secularist regime and the stability that it is seen to ensure, at least leave room 
for the survival of an Orthodox Christian community in the country. The pres-
ence of an Orthodox community is also an important element in the Azerbai-
jani government’s diplomacy with Russia, Belarus, and Serbia, and in its efforts 
to upkeep the image of a “land of tolerance” that the regime has promoted to 
the international community.28
 Which “Diaspora” Identity?
Due to its size and population share, the Orthodox Slavic community in Azer-
baijan represents a paradigm quite different from its counterparts in Kazakh-
stan and some of the Baltic countries, where people of the same background 
form as much as one-fifth of the population. In its present share, it is too small 
to form a real voting bloc or a base for an effective communalist political 
movement. It does have a social and cultural identity perceived to be definitely 
different from the country’s majority population. And Orthodoxy occupies a 
rather important position in this identity. Figure 10 shows that, in the current 
conditions and despite its near-insignificant population share, the Orthodox 
community in Azerbaijan, especially in Baku where the critical mass of kinfolk 
and fellow parishioners remains much larger than in Ganja and especially the 
countryside, feels that it can somehow sufficiently preserve its individuality.
The Orthodox community exists in a space defined by a long historical pres-
ence in the country dating back generations, by the opportunities created dur-
ing the years of economic growth in Azerbaijan, and by the modalities and 
conditions created by the official interpretation and practice of secularism 
and inter-ethnic and religious tolerance. As Figure 11 reflects, the main societal 
challenges and threats identified by the Orthodox, frequently based on person-
al experiences in everyday life, are pretty similar to those that generally come 
forward when one asks the same question to the Muslim Azerbaijani major-
ity: unemployment, corruption, including economic monopolies, the state of 
health care and education, and, perhaps surprisingly to some, the occupation 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, especially because of the potential that this now-frozen 
war may flare up again.
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There does not seems to be complete disengagement on this important is-
sue in the national narrative of Azerbaijan. As a matter of fact, a view that 
came up several times during interviews and informal conversations in the 
Baku area was that Slavs have also been negatively affected by the Nagorno-
Karabakh war, specifically the Molokan villages in the areas that were shelled 
and Stepanakert’s small Slavic Orthodox population, which had to flee to Baku 
or Russia during the hostilities. Despite the assistance given by Russian units 
or at least certain individual commanders to Armenian separatists during the 
Nagorno-Karabakh war, only 2.6 percent of the Orthodox respondents felt that 
their community is perceived as pro-Armenian. A joint 65 percent of those 
questioned even have negative or very negative feelings vis-à-vis Armenia as a 
Don’t know or no
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35 (11.7 percent)
No, practically not
7 (2.3 percent)
Only up to a
certain level
43 (14.3 percent)
Yes, to a suff icient
level
215 (71.7 percent)
Figure 10 Can the Orthodox community preserve its ethnic and confessional identity in Azer-
baijan? (in number of respondents and percent share)
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Figure 11 Main societal challenges and threats affecting Azerbaijani society as perceived by its 
Slavic Orthodox minority (in number of respondents, several answers possible)
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29 Sébastien Peyrouse, “Existe-t-il un ancrage spatial des minorités chrétiennes en Asie cen-
trale? Le poids du passé russo-soviétique,” Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditer-
ranée, special thematic issue of Identités confessionelles et psychologiques en terres d’islam 
107–110 (2005): 465–466.
30 Pål Kolstø, “The New Russian Diaspora—An Identity of Its Own? Possible Identity Tra-
jectories for Russians in the Former Soviet Republics,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 9, no. 3 
(1996): 613–617.
state, which leans toward the predominant opinion in Azerbaijani society. The 
sincere majority feeling here though, might lean more toward a neutral stance 
or indifference. But given the high sensitivity of the topic and given the minor-
ity paradigm, we might have a ‘sociological trap’ in which many respondents 
provided answers considered “safe” or socially desirable.
Orthodox and other traditional oriental Christian churches are not repre-
sented among Azerbaijan’s Shia and Sunni Muslim majority per se, contrary 
to the activities of non-traditional Christian currents like Pentecostalism that 
also proselytize among Muslims, often half-underground or through front or-
ganizations such as book cafés and language courses. Also, the Orthodox and 
Slavs are not perceived to be particularly privileged nor to control certain sec-
tors of the economy or economic monopolies. And the fact that there is no 
Slavic Orthodox concentration in a geographic area bordering Russia means 
that they are not considered potentially separatist or a threat to national unity, 
either. In line with Sébastien Peyrouse’s observations on the other side of the 
Caspian, the main confessional cleavage in Azerbaijan lies elsewhere: between 
traditional and state-sanctioned Islam and Christianity on one hand, and non-
traditional currents and practices like the independent Shia movements, Salaf-
ism, Protestantism, and Pentecostalism, on the other.29
In what diaspora identity do the Orthodox Slavs of Azerbaijan eventually 
fit, then? To answer this, we look into the typology in Table 2, which is based 
on the most useful model by Pål Kolstø. We enlarged this schematization with 
a number of historical and current examples to offer a basis for comparison. 
In the original model, Kolstø states that Slavic and culturally Orthodox diaspo-
ras may be confronted with a choice between three cultural identities: iden-
tification with the dominant culture in the external homeland; development 
of a new but basically Slavic self-understanding; and identification with the 
dominant culture in the state of residence. At the same time, politically, Kolstø 
proposes four options: loyalty toward the historical boundaries of the greater 
Russian state; loyalty toward the present and much-reduced Russian state; as-
pirations to create a new nation-state; and finally, loyalty toward the national-
izing state of residence.30
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If one puts these options against the historical as well as current realities of the 
Orthodox in Azerbaijan, there is clearly no separatist tendency nor any move-
ment to set up parallel institutions among the population of interest or certain 
groups or segments therein, nor aspirations to create a new nation-state. What 
there is can be situated on the intersection of nationalizing states of residence, 
identification with historical boundaries, and identification with an external 
homeland. This manifests itself in two ways. To start with the  Soviet legacy, 
both the Azerbaijani majority and the Slavic minorities share an experience 
of nation-building under a system that privileged the ethnic-national over 
the confessional. The Slavic component was generally dominant or at least a 
Table 2 Possible Slavic diaspora identities within the former ussr
Political loyalty Cultural self-understanding
External 
homeland
A new entity (virtual or 
physical)
Nationalizing state of 
residence
Historical boundaries 
(reconstitution of the 
ussr)
Traditional Soviet 
(support for repub-
lican Communist 
Parties)
The “neo-Cossacks” with 
maximum program (the 
Kokchetau Cossacks in 
1995, the “Pugachev group” 
in Ust-Kamenogorsk in 
1999, both in Kazakhstan)
Support for republi-
can state elites issued 
from the ussr and 
the old Communist 
Party apparatus.
External homeland  
(the Russian 
Federation)
Irredentism (the 
Crimean reattach-
ment, the Donbass 
uprising)
The “neo-Cossacks” with 
minimal program (Cossacks 
in Belarus and Azerbaijan), 
the Slavic movement Lad 
in northern Kazakhstan in 
1992–1997
Orientation toward 
Russian media and 
popular culture, 
identification with 
Orthodox Christianity 
(“ethno-Christianity”).
A new state of its own — Transnistria, the Donetsk 
and Lugansk republics in 
eastern Ukraine
—
Nationalizing state of 
residence
Integrating na-
tional minority
— Assimilation or 
co-optation
Source: Table created by Bruno De Cordier, on the basis of Pål Kolstø,  “Beyond Russia, Becom-
ing Local: Trajectories of Adaptation to the Fall of the Soviet Union among Ethnic Russians in 
the Former Soviet Republics,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 2, no. 2 (2011): 158.
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31 See also Peyrouse, “Existe-t-il un ancrage spatial des minorités chrétiennes en Asie 
centrale?”
32 Kathy Rousselet, “L’Église orthodoxe russe et le territoire,” Revue d’études comparatives 
Est-Ouest, special issue, La Russie: géographie des territoires (2007): 76–77.
33 Bruce Grant, “Cosmopolitan Baku,” Ethnos 75, no. 2 (2010): 123. See also the different 
chapters and testimonies in Bakhram Bagirzade, Gorod moey molodosti (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 
2012).
 long-dominant minority – “the majority of the minority” – at the level of the 
Azerbaijani ssr.31
This historical experience still causes the Orthodox to identify with a greater 
Russian space. Belonging to this space is defined, first of all, by the  Russian lan-
guage. Second, there are the predominantly positive to very positive memories 
of the ussr, prevalent among 63 percent of the respondents, either through 
direct personal experience, idealized memories, and inter-generational lore. 
Third, there are ties and interactions with relatives in Russia, which 45.3 
 percent of the interviewed reported having. And fourth, there is the influence 
of information channels from Russia, which 44 percent declared to be their 
primary source of information. Slightly over 90 percent have a very or rather 
positive view of Russia as a country and society and 64.7 percent strongly sup-
port a close association if not union among Azerbaijan, Russia, and Belarus. 
Orthodoxy here is a component of an ethnic identity that, in turn, reflects a 
cultural-social association with Russia or at least a Russian greater space rather 
than the existence of an Orthodox nation per se.32 This could change though; 
for example, if the erosion of ethnic identity through linguistic assimilation 
and intermarriage leads to a stronger emphasis, among part of the culturally 
Orthodox, on their confessional distinctiveness.
A portion of Baku’s Slavic and culturally Orthodox community sees itself 
(as do much of the ethnically Azerbaijani urban intelligentsia) as bearers of a 
specific, long-standing Baku identity. This identity is, or was, first, perceived to 
be characterized by a strong multi-ethnicity, when the city was still inhabited 
by Slavs, Azerbaijani, a sizeable Armenian community, and an active Jewish 
minority. Until 1979, ethnic Azerbaijanis did not even constitute the majority 
of the city’s population. As Bruce Grant observed, most visitors to the capital 
of the former Azerbaijani ssr were familiar with its cosmopolitanism and in-
ternationalism, which was often emphasized by its inhabitants.33 It was also 
seen to be characterized, in reality as well as idealized lore, by sophistication, a 
strong Russified intelligentsia and (relative) permissiveness in terms of culture 
and social mores.
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34 Observations and conversations in Ivanovka, October 2014.
This identity is strongly felt to be lost since the departure of a large por-
tion of the Slavs and most Armenians after 1988–1991 and since the arrival of 
Azerbaijanis displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh and, especially, of the masses 
of rural migrants from the provinces, to the extent that the titular nationality 
now forms 90 percent of the city’s population. The gradual demolition of older 
residential quarters like the old Sovietskii area and Yasamal to make room for 
posh apartments and condos also adds to a feeling that the old, organic Baku 
identity is dying fast. Many claim that today the city’s cosmopolitan and ap-
parently tolerant character only remains in some parts of the city center like 
the old Baksoviet area and among the Russified intelligentsia. But for the rest, 
the korennye bakintsy (“native Bakuvians,” to which many local Slavs feel to 
belong) who perceive themselves as distinct, well-educated, mannered people, 
and the rayonnye (“district folk,” people that migrated to Baku from other parts 
of the country) now form separate worlds.
Although not mainstream Orthodox, the Molokans, a “minority within the 
minority,” are generally considered to be part of the country’s Slavic stratum 
both by the majority and by the mainstream Orthodox. Among the Azer-
baijani majority, Molokans are generally viewed with a certain regard and 
appreciation, not only for being Russians, but also for their work ethic and well- 
organized community. This view has created a certain attractiveness for the 
village of Ivanovka, which is both the Molokans’ demographic center and 
home to the last collective farm in the country. As a result, the area has seen 
its population change over the last 15 years or so. One-third of the population 
there is now Azerbaijani. Nevertheless, the growing interest among Azerbai-
jani for Ivanovka is not met with the same enthusiasm by the Molokans them-
selves, who are uncertain about the future of their close-knit, endogamous, 
and agriculture-based community.34
 Conclusion
The main existential threat to the Slavic population, and hence Orthodoxy, in 
the country today, is an aging ethnic-demographic base that is not going to be 
adequately replaced, especially outside of Baku, by either natural replacement 
or new followers. One of the factors that retains its acceptance by the major-
ity culture, namely that it does not actively try to gain a following beyond its 
traditional Slavic community, thus stunts its future presence in the country. 
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As for the Molokans, it remains to be seen whether the group can perpetuate 
its endogamous social order without compromising its identity.
Unless radical instances of historical breaking points occur, Orthodoxy will 
not disappear from Azerbaijan. Even if in the future, Islam, moreover Shiism, 
could, and likely will, play a stronger role in both society and governance, this 
should not be an impediment for the perpetuation of an Orthodox community 
in the country. But its base will unavoidably become more heterogeneous if it 
is to endure, not only consisting of the numerically smaller segments of young-
er Slavs, but also expatriate Russians, people of mixed origin or unclear ethnic-
confessional identity – who might even become its most active adherents and 
advocates – and adherents of smaller, traditional-Christian groups that could 
be absorbed. In such circumstance, the Church and its Baku eparchy will likely 
build their legitimacy as bearers of a continuity of Christianity in the southern 
Caspian, which started with the Udi-Albanian Church and to which they al-
ready often refer in their discourse.
